Evaluative adjectives, e.g., beautiful and tasty are commonly considered as a special case of relative adjectives in including some evaluative feature, e.g. a judge parameter. In the talk, I will suggest a semantic interpretation of evaluative predicates based on Hare (1952), distinguishing between a fixed evaluative meaning component – calling something beautiful means commending it – and a quasi-denotational meaning component given by multiple dimensions varying across comparison classes.
The core claim will be that the notion of 'standing out' or 'being noteworthy' used in the interpretation of the positive form of dimensional predicates is a bleached form of commending in the sense of Hare. From this point of view, dimensional predicates are a special case of evaluative ones by involving only one metric dimension which is, moreover, constant across comparison classes.

Based on the observation that Free Indirect Discourse (FID) as a special form of speech or thought representation is only available in fictional narratives, not in oral conversation, Kuroda (1976) argues that fictional narratives that allow FID are not told by a narrator (see also Hamburger 1968 and Banfield 1982). Crucially, he turns this assumption into a general argument against the communication-based view of language according to which each occurrence of a sentence is to be interpreted as the content of an utterance by a speaker or narrator. Recent formal analyses of FID such as Schlenker (2004), Sharvit (2008), Eckardt (2014) and Maier (2015), in contrast, take the presence of an abstract narrator for granted (see also Rauh 1978). Based on evidence from the crime novels by Wolf Haas, I will argue for a flexible view according to which the prominence status of the narrator as perspective-taker can vary throughout a longer text. Crucially, the availability of FID does not depend on the absence of a speaker or narrator. Rather, what is required is that the narrator is not locally prominent as perspective-taker.

Usually, semantic theories assume that there is one objective context for each utterance. I will present a number of cases that show that this assumption is too simplistic for natural language discourse and that we need a more macro level view on what a context is; the classic motion of a context rathercorresponds to the micro level. This will lead to some cases where we have to distinguish between subjective contexts and intersubjective contexts, which leads to some interesting philosophical challenges.

A common concept of "objectivity" in modern moral philosophy could be expressed as follows: moral norms, ethical principle, moral judgments, etc., qualify as "objective" to the extent that they can be "interpersonally justified". But what does "interpersonal justification" amount to? Inspired by Wittgenstein's dictum (Philosophical Investigations § 43), philosophers in the tradition of so-called ordinary language conceive of "interpersonal justification" in terms of "socially shared practices and standards of (moral) reasoning". This answer is frequently met with the objection that "justification" itself is a (rationally) normative concept that cannot be identified with any descriptive account of social practices. I think that the objection is misguided. Conceptual analysis, as understood in ordinary language philosophy, is not the same as giving a description of how people reason or argue in moral contexts. In my presentation, I will put forward some points concerning the understanding of what the analysis of "social practice(s)" is about, and in what sense such an analysis helps us to disclose rationally normative and morally normative standards of reasoning.

Normativität, Objektivität, und ordinary language-Philosophie
Eine weit verbreitete Auffassung von "Objektivität" in der modernen Moralphilosophie könnte man wie folgt zusammenfassen: als "objektiv" gelten diejenigen moralischen Normen, Prinzipien und Urteile, die sich "interpersonell rechtfertigen" lassen. Was aber zählt als "interpersonelle Rechtfertigung"? Im Anschluss an Wittgenstein's Diktum (Philosophische Untersuchungen § 43) argumenten Philosophen in der Tradition der ordinary language-Philosophie, dass sich philosophische Auffassungen von "interpersoneller Rechtfertigung" an "sozial geteilten Praktiken und Standards moralischen Argumentierens" orientieren sollen. Dem wird häufig entgegengehalten, dass "Rechtfertigung" selbst ein (rationalitätstheoretisch) normativer Begriff ist, der nicht mit deskriptiven Beschreibungen sozial geteilter Rechtfertigungspraktiken identifiziert werden. Ich halte diesen Einwand für fehlgeleitet. Ordinary language orientierte Begriffsanalysen geben keine rein deskriptiven Beschreibungen. In meinem Vortrag werde ich einige Punkte betreffend das Verständnis "sozialer Praktiken" thematisieren und zeigen, wie ordinary language orientierte Begriffsanalysen dazu beitragen können, Standards interpersoneller Rechtfertigung freizulegen, die sowohl rational als auch moralisch normativ sind.

In an explanation, what does the explaining and what gets explained? What are the relata of the explanation relation? Are explanations audience-variant?